Networking Games: Network Forming Games and Games on Networks
- Length: 322 pages
- Edition: 1
- Language: English
- Publisher: Academic Press
- Publication Date: 2019-01-30
- ISBN-10: 0128165510
- ISBN-13: 9780128165515
- Sales Rank: #12013146 (See Top 100 Books)
Networking Games: Network Forming Games and Games on Networks applies game theory methods to network analyses. Its concentration on rigorous mathematical techniques distinguishes it from other books on game theory. Developed by a mathematician and game theorist with extensive contributions to applied mathematics, game and probability theory, and written for graduate students and professionals, the book’s illuminations on network games can be applied to problems in economics (in industrial organization, regulation and competition policy, for instance) and operations research.
Cover image Title page Table of Contents Copyright Preface Introduction Chapter 1: Nash Equilibrium Abstract 1.1. Nash equilibrium 1.2. Cooperation and competition 1.3. Examples of load balancing games 1.4. Convex games References Chapter 2: Congestion Games Abstract 2.1. Potential games 2.2. Congestion games 2.3. Player-specific congestion games 2.4. Congestion games with strategy set constraint References Chapter 3: Routing Games Abstract 3.1. The KP-model of optimal routing with unsplittable traffic. The price of anarchy 3.2. Pure strategy equilibrium. Braess's paradox 3.3. Completely mixed equilibrium in the problem with inhomogeneous users and homogeneous channels 3.4. The price of anarchy in the model with parallel channels and unsplittable traffic 3.5. The price of anarchy in the model with linear social cost and unsplittable traffic for an arbitrary network 3.6. The mixed price of anarchy in the model with linear social cost and unsplittable traffic for an arbitrary network 3.7. The price of anarchy in the model with maximal social cost and unsplittable traffic for an arbitrary network 3.8. The Wardrop optimal routing model with splittable traffic 3.9. The optimal routing model with parallel channels. The Pigou model. Braess's paradox 3.10. Potential in the model with splittable traffic for an arbitrary network 3.11. Social cost in the model with splittable traffic for convex latency functions 3.12. The price of anarchy in the model with splittable traffic for linear latency functions 3.13. Potential in the Wardrop model with parallel channels for player-specific linear latency functions 3.14. The price of anarchy in an arbitrary network for player-specific linear latency functions 3.15. The Wardrop model with parallel channels and incomplete information 3.16. Equilibria in the model with incomplete information 3.17. Potential and existence of Wardrop equilibrium in the model with incomplete information References Chapter 4: Load Balancing Game Abstract 4.1. A model of the load balancing game 4.2. The price of anarchy in the general case of N processors 4.3. The price of anarchy in the case of three processors 4.4. A numerical method to calculate the price of anarchy 4.5. Computing experiments References Chapter 5: Cover Game Abstract 5.1. A model of the cover game 5.2. The price of anarchy in the general case of N processors 5.3. The price of anarchy in the case of three processors 5.4. A numerical method to calculate the price of anarchy 5.5. Computing experiments References Chapter 6: Networks and Graphs Abstract 6.1. Classical betweenness centrality for the nodes and edges of a graph 6.2. The PageRank method 6.3. Centrality measure for weighted graphs based on Kirchhoff's law 6.4. Centrality measure for weighted graphs as a solution of cooperative game References Chapter 7: Social Networks Abstract 7.1. Graph construction for social network 7.2. Centrality measures for social networks 7.3. Modeling professional links by coauthored publications 7.4. Community detection in networks 7.5. Hedonic games 7.6. A search algorithm for Nash stable partition References Chapter 8: Games on Transportation Networks Abstract 8.1. Transportation network and correspondence matrix 8.2. Traffic intensity calculation: an example 8.3. A model of public transport system 8.4. Optimal distribution and the Wardrop equilibrium principle References Chapter 9: Models of Transportation Market Abstract 9.1. Allocation model over a graph 9.2. Pricing game over a graph 9.3. Allocation game over a graph 9.4. Modeling of air transportation market References Chapter 10: Games With Request Flows in Service Systems Abstract 10.1. Arrival time choice in a one-server system with sequential requests 10.2. Arrival time choice in a random-access two-server system with arbitrary requests References Chapter 11: Cloud Operator Games Abstract 11.1. Cloud computing market 11.2. Game-theoretical model 11.3. Two-player game 11.4. Symmetric case for n-player game 11.5. Numerical simulations 11.6. Two-sided telecommunication market 11.7. Generalized Hotelling specification for two operators 11.8. Two operators and company-dependent client preferences 11.9. Two operators and operator-dependent client preferences 11.10. M operators and company-dependent client preferences References References Index
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