Managerial Economics & Organizational Architecture, 7th Edition
- Length: 400 pages
- Edition: 7
- Language: English
- Publisher: McGraw Hill
- Publication Date: 2021
- ISBN-10: 1260571211
- ISBN-13: 9781260571219
- Sales Rank: #764985 (See Top 100 Books)
ISBN: 9781260571219 is an International Student Edition of Managerial Economics & Organizational Architecture. 7th Edition. By James Brickley, Clifford W. Smith and Jerold Zimmerman. This ISBN is student textbook only. It does not come with online access code. Access code, if required by an instructor, sold separately at another ISBN. The content of international edition is the same as other formats. Empower your students to solve today’s important business problems with the basic tools of economics and without overwhelming calculus. Ideal for MBA courses, Brickley focus on data-driven decision-making and managerial applications within the structure of an organization. Using multidisciplinary examples, students leverage the underlying economic framework to analyze a variety of problems managers face today. It also provides an in-depth analysis of the firm and corporate governance topics. Brickley paired with Connect Economics provides assignable,auto-gradable versions of test bank content. Assignable content is fully integrated with the eBook. Students are also able to search, highlight, and take notes within the ReadAnywhere eBook and complete adaptive reading assignments offline. Connect provides instructors with powerful reporting tools allowing them to plan, track, and analyze student performance across learning outcomes
Cover Series Page Title Page Copyright Dedication Preface Connect Acknowledgments Contents in Brief Contents Part 1: Basic Concepts Chapter 1: Introduction Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture Organizational Architecture Economic Analysis Economic Darwinism Survival of the Fittest Economic Darwinism and Benchmarking Purpose of the Book Our Approach to Organizations Chapter 2: Economists’ View of Behavior Economic Behavior: An Overview Economic Choice Marginal Analysis Opportunity Costs Creativity of Individuals Graphical Tools Individual Objectives Indifference Curves Opportunities and Constraints Individual Choice Changes in Choice Motivating Honesty at Wells Fargo Managerial Implications Alternative Models of Behavior Only-Money-Matters Model Happy-Is-Productive Model Good-Citizen Model Product-of-the-Environment Model Which Model Should Managers Use? Behavioral Economics Decision Making under Uncertainty Expected Value Variability Risk Aversion Certainty Equivalent and Risk Premium Risk Aversion and Compensation Summary Appendix A: Consumer Choice Appendix B: Inter-Temporal Decisions and the Fisher Separation Theorem Chapter 3: Exchange and Markets Goals of Economic Systems Property Rights and Exchange in a Market Economy Dimensions of Property Rights Gains from Trade Basics of Supply and Demand The Price Mechanism Shifts in Curves versus Movements along Curves Using Supply and Demand Analysis for Qualitative Forecasts Linear Supply and Demand Supply and Demand—Extended Analysis Price versus Quantity Adjustments Short-Run versus Long-Run Effects Industry Cost Increases and Price Adjustments Prices as Social Coordinators Efficient Exchange and Production Measuring the Gains from Trade Government Intervention Externalities and the Coase Theorem Markets versus Central Planning General versus Specific Knowledge Knowledge Creation Specific Knowledge and the Economic System Incentives in Markets Contracting Costs and Existence of Firms Contracting Costs in Markets Contracting Costs within Firms Managerial Decisions Summary Appendix: Shareholder Value and Market Efficiency Part 2: Managerial Economics Chapter 4: Demand Demand Functions Demand Curves Law of Demand Elasticity of Demand Linear Demand Curves Other Factors That Influence Demand Prices of Related Products Income Other Variables Industry versus Firm Demand Network Effects Product Attributes Product Life Cycles Demand Estimation Interviews Price Experimentation Statistical Analysis Implications Summary Appendix: Demand Chapter 5: Production and Cost Production Functions Returns to Scale Returns to a Factor Choice of Inputs Production Isoquants Isocost Lines Cost Minimization Changes in Input Prices Costs Cost Curves Short Run versus Long Run Minimum Efficient Scale Economies and Diseconomies of Scale Learning Curves Economies of Scope Profit Maximization Factor Demand Curves Cost Estimation Summary Appendix: The Factor-Balance Equation Chapter 6: Market Structure Markets Competitive Markets Firm Supply Competitive Equilibrium Barriers to Entry Incumbent Reactions Incumbent Advantages Exit Costs Monopoly Monopolistic Competition Oligopoly Nash Equilibrium Output Competition Price Competition Empirical Evidence Cooperation and the Prisoners’ Dilemma Summary Chapter 7: Pricing with Market Power Pricing Objective Benchmark Case: Single Price per Unit Profit Maximization Estimating the Profit-Maximizing Price Potential for Higher Profits Homogeneous Consumer Demands Block Pricing Two-Part Tariffs Price Discrimination—Heterogeneous Consumer Demands Exploiting Information about Individual Demands Using Information about the Distribution of Demands Bundling Other Concerns Multiperiod Considerations Strategic Interaction Legal Issues Implementing a Pricing Strategy Summary Chapter 8: Economics of Strategy: Creating and Capturing Value Strategy Value Creation Production and Producer Transaction Costs Consumer Transaction Costs Other Ways to Increase Demand New Products and Services Cooperating to Increase Value Converting Organizational Knowledge into Value Opportunities to Create Value Capturing Value Market Power Superior Factors of Production A Partial Explanation for Walmart’s Success All Good Things Must End Economics of Diversification Benefits of Diversification Costs of Diversification Management Implications Strategy Formulation Understanding Resources and Capabilities Understanding the Environment Combining Environmental and Internal Analyses Strategy and Organizational Architecture Can All Firms Capture Value? Summary Chapter 9: Economics of Strategy: Game Theory Game Theory Simultaneous-Move, Nonrepeated Interaction Analyzing the Payoffs Dominant Strategies Nash Equilibrium Revisited Competition versus Coordination Mixed Strategies Managerial Implications Sequential Interactions First-Mover Advantage Strategic Moves Managerial Implications Repeated Strategic Interaction Strategic Interaction and Organizational Architecture Summary Appendix: Repeated Interaction and the Teammates’ Dilemma Chapter 10: Incentive Conflicts and Contracts Firms Incentive Conflicts within Firms Owner-Manager Conflicts Other Conflicts Controlling Incentive Problems through Contracts Costless Contracting Costly Contracting and Asymmetric Information Postcontractual Information Problems Precontractual Information Problems Implicit Contracts and Reputational Concerns Incentives to Economize on Contracting Costs Summary Part 3: Designing Organizational Architecture Chapter 11: Organizational Architecture The Fundamental Problem Architecture of Markets Architecture within Firms Architectural Determinants Changing Architecture Interdependencies and Complementarities within the Organization Corporate Culture When Management Chooses an Inappropriate Architecture Managerial Implications Evaluating Management Advice Benchmarking Summary Chapter 12: Decision Rights: The Level of Empowerment Assigning Tasks and Decision Rights Centralization versus Decentralization Benefits of Decentralization Costs of Decentralization Illustrating the Trade-offs Management Implications Lateral Decision-Right Assignment Assigning Decision Rights to Teams Benefits of Team Decision Making Costs of Team Decision Making Management Implications Decision Management and Control Decision-Right Assignment and Knowledge Creation Influence Costs Summary Appendix: Collective Decision Making Chapter 13: Decision Rights: Bundling Tasks into Jobs and Subunits Bundling Tasks into Jobs Specialized versus Broad Task Assignment Productive Bundling of Tasks Bundling of Jobs into Subunits Grouping Jobs by Function Grouping Jobs by Product or Geography Trade-offs between Functional and Product or Geographic Subunits Environment, Strategy, and Architecture Matrix Organizations Mixed Designs Network Organizations Organizing within Subunits Recent Trends in Assignments of Decision Rights Summary Appendix: Battle of the Functional Managers Chapter 14: Attracting and Retaining Qualified Employees Contracting Objectives The Level of Pay The Basic Competitive Model Human Capital Compensating Differentials Costly Information about Market Wage Rates Internal Labor Markets Reasons for Long-Term Employment Relationships Costs of Internal Labor Markets Pay in Internal Labor Markets Careers and Lifetime Pay Influence Costs The Salary–Fringe Benefit Mix Employee Preferences Employer Considerations The Salary–Fringe Benefit Choice Summary Chapter 15: Incentive Compensation The Basic Incentive Problem Incentives from Ownership Optimal Risk Sharing Effective Incentive Contracts Principal-Agent Model Informativeness Principle Group Incentive Pay Multitasking Forms of Incentive Pay Incentive Compensation and Information Revelation Selection Effects of Incentive Contracts Does Incentive Pay Work? Summary Appendix: Multitasking Theory Chapter 16: Individual Performance Evaluation Setting Performance Benchmarks Time and Motion Studies Past Performance and the Ratchet Effect Measurement Costs Opportunism Gaming Horizon Problem Relative Performance Evaluation Within-Firm Performance Across-Firm Performance Subjective Performance Evaluation Multitasking and Unbalanced Effort Subjective Evaluation Methods Problems with Subjective Performance Evaluations Combining Objective and Subjective Performance Measures Team Performance Team Production Evaluating Teams Government Regulation of Labor Markets Summary Appendix: Optimal Weights in a Relative Performance Contract Chapter 17: Divisional Performance Evaluation Measuring Divisional Performance Cost Centers Expense Centers Revenue Centers Profit Centers Investment Centers Transfer Pricing Economics of Transfer Pricing Common Transfer-Pricing Methods Reorganization: The Solution If All Else Fails Internal Accounting System and Performance Evaluation Uses of the Accounting System Trade-offs between Decision Management and Decision Control Summary Capstone Case Study on Organizational Architecture: Arthur Andersen LLP Part 4: Applications of Organizational Architecture Chapter 18: Corporate Governance Publicly Traded Corporations Corporate Form of Organization Stock Exchanges Stock Ownership Patterns Governance Objectives Separation of Ownership and Control Incentive Issues Survival of Corporations Benefits of Publicly Traded Corporations Top-Level Architecture in U.S. Corporations Sources of Decision Rights Shareholders Board of Directors Top Management External Monitors International Corporate Governance Market Forces Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Corporate Governance: An Historical Perspective Summary Appendix: Choosing among the Legal Forms of Organization Chapter 19: Vertical Integration and Outsourcing Vertical Chain of Production Benefits of Buying in Competitive Markets Reasons for Nonmarket Transactions Contracting Costs Market Power Taxes and Regulation Other Considerations Vertical Integration versus Long-Term Contracts Incomplete Contracting Ownership and Investment Incentives Specific Assets and Vertical Integration Asset Ownership Other Reasons Continuum of Choice Contract Duration Contracting with Distributors Free-Rider Problems Double Markups Regulatory Issues Trends in Outsourcing Summary Appendix: Ownership Rights and Investment Incentives Web Chapter 20: Leadership: Motivating Change within Organizations Leadership Vision Setting Motivation Decision Making within Firms Incentive Problems and Organizational Politics Understanding Attitudes toward Change Changing Organizational Architecture Proposal Design Maintaining Flexibility Commitment Distributional Consequences Marketing a Proposal Careful Analysis and Groundwork Relying on Reputation Emphasizing a Crisis Organizational Power Sources of Power Tying the Proposal to Another Initiative Coalitions and Logrolling Is Organizational Power Bad? The Use of Symbols Summary Appendix: Strategic Value of Commitment and Crisis Chapter 21: Understanding the Business Environment: The Economics of Regulation Importance of Regulation to Managers Economic Motives for Government Intervention Defining and Enforcing Property Rights Redressing Market Failures Redistributing Wealth Economic Theory of Regulation Demand for Regulation: Special Interests Supply of Regulation: Politicians Market for Regulation Deadweight Losses, Transaction Costs, and Wealth Transfers Managerial Implications Restricting Entry and Limiting Substitutes Forming Coalitions On Business Participation in the Political Process Summary Chapter 22: Ethics and Organizational Architecture Ethics and Choices Corporate Mission: Ethics and Policy Setting Ethics Value Maximization Corporate Social Responsibility Economists’ View of Social Responsibility Corporate Policy Setting Mechanisms for Encouraging Ethical Behavior Contracting Costs: Ethics and Policy Implementation Codes of Ethics Altering Preferences Education Corporate Culture Summary Web Chapter 23: Organizational Architecture and the Process of Management Innovation Management Innovations The Demand for Management Innovations The Rise of TQM Other Innovations Why Management Innovations Often Fail Marketing Underestimating Costs of Change Failure to Consider Other Legs of the Stool Managing Changes in Organizational Architecture Summary Index Web Glossary
Donate to keep this site alive
1. Disable the AdBlock plugin. Otherwise, you may not get any links.
2. Solve the CAPTCHA.
3. Click download link.
4. Lead to download server to download.